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SUCCESS FOR THE WHOLE FOOD CHAIN: TESTING THE MODEL OF NETWORK
SUCCESS INUKRAINE
Abstract
Most empirical studies that declare their focus on network success or performance investigate the
achievement of goals by an individual firm participating in a network. Goals that are set at the
network level are mainly neglected. The aim of this study is to develop and test the model that
includes goal achievement at both the firm and network levels. We test our model in the context
of strategic supply chain networks in the Ukrainian food industry. The results indicate that
network-level goals really exist in strategic networks and are subject to significant effect on the
part of cooperation and coordination.
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Introduction
As suggested by the proponents of the relational view of strategic management, the advantages of
an individual firm are often linked to the advantages of the network of relationships in which the
firm is embedded (DYER AND SINGH, 1998). Accordingly, there is an ongoing discussion on how
to manage a firm’s network of relationships successfully, i.e. such that the firm’s competitive
advantage is sustained (GULATI ET AL.,2000; KALE ET AL.,2002).
It seems, however, that the discussion on network management has not exhaustively addressed
the “network management – network success – firm success” cause-and-effect chain. Given that
success generally means the achievement of goals, we argue that the “network success” link has
been understudied, in particular, because of incomplete interpretation of network goals. In fact,
most empirical studies that declare their focus on the network success or performance address the
achievement of goals by an individual firm participating in a network and analyse the role of
network-related “collective constructs” such as inter-firm trust, commitment and relational norms
(MEDLIN, 2006: 860) in achieving those goals. Yet, goals that are set at the network level, i.e.
collectively pursued outcomes are mainly neglected although their presence and relevance in
inter-organisational relationships has been widely emphasised (e.g. WINKLER,2006; PROVAN AND
KENIS, 2007).
As shown by MEDLIN (2006), studying collective constructs needs to be undertaken with regard
to both collective and self-interest outcomes. Focussing solely on goals of an individual firm in a
network will provide biased results with respect to management styles that are actually based
around self and collective interests, i.e. around the whole network of relationships. Thus, without
simultaneous consideration of goals at the firm and network levels and without understanding of
how the network should be managed in this respect, the whole network’s success will remain
under-defined and the validity of the derived implications will be brought into challenge.
Therefore, the aim of this study is to develop and test the model that includes the relationships
between goal achievement at the firm and network levels, the network management’s goal2
achievement and the theoretical constructs that are conceptualised as the determinants of goal
achievement. We test our model of the whole network’s success in the context of supply chain
networks in the food industry. In particular, our study examines the relationships 1) between a
food manufacturer and its independent (upstream) suppliers and 2) between the food
manufacturer and its independent (downstream) customers.
The paper proceeds as follows. First, we delineate the theoretical foundations of supply chain
network management. In this part, we build on prior research on management of procurement
relationships to generate hypotheses that constitute our conceptual model. Next, we test the
model and discuss the results. Finally, we derive some implications.
2 Theory and hypotheses
Among networks in which firms are embedded, there has been a growing interest in networks of
procurement relationships. Accordingly, the discussion on network management has taken place
in the context of so-called supply chain networks (WATHNE AND HEIDE, 2004; HANF AND
DAUTZENBERG, 2006). In this paper, we use the term “supply chain network” as defined by HANF
ET AL. (2009: 46): “A supply chain network involves long-term and recurrent, formal and
informal relationships of material, resource, financial and information exchange among more
than two participants of the supply chain that are strictly coordinated by the focal firm and aim at
fulfilment of certain strategic tasks.” This definition generally follows the logic of strategic
network theorists who posit that a firm is in control of a network of other firms and operates as a
hub firm, channel, or network captain, and is concerned with the management of the network
(GULATI ET AL.,2000).
The main challenge for the focal actor in managing the supply chain network is adaptation to
uncertainty which depends on how the connected relationships are organised (WATHNE AND
HEIDE, 2004). In this context, GULATI ET AL. (2005) have posited that adaptation in the
procurement relationship involves fulfilment of the coordination and cooperation tasks. The
coordination task is the alignment of actions, i.e. enabling a joint action, whereas the cooperation
task is the alignment of interests, i.e. motivation of the exchange parties. Furthermore, HANF AND
DAUTZENBERG (2006) have shown that individual and collective interests as well as individual
and collective actions are entwined in supply chain networks and, therefore, respective collective
strategies have to be aimed at the simultaneous alignment of interests and actions at least at two
levels – the firm and network levels (HANF AND DAUTZENBERG,2006: 80).
The strategic management literature has mainly addressed collective strategies in the context of
their orientation towards reduction of variation in inter-organisational environment (BRESSER
AND HARL, 1986). However, in the strategic network context, collective strategies aim not only to
shape the network processes and relationships but also to achieve certain network goals (SYDOW
AND WINDELER, 1998: 268). In a strategic network in which a focal firm is responsible for the
correctness of attributes of the final product (HANF AND DAUTZENBERG, 2006), a collective
strategy will be most often goal-oriented. Thus, we suggest that a collective strategy may be
perceived as a framework of activities to sustain a network’s success because it aims at the
achievement of network goals. Beyond that, we posit that network goals may be used to define
what the supply chain network’s success is. We further describe the dimensions of network
success in detail and develop hypotheses on interrelatedness of constructs that compose these
dimensions.
2.1 Network goals3
To consider network goals, one needs a multiple-constituencies approach (PROVAN AND KENIS,
2007) because there are multiple parties to a network, including each participating firm as an
independent organisation, the network’s management, and the community, i.e. consumers, non-
governmental organisations, and the government (ARIÑO, 2003: 68). Similarly to ARIÑO (2003),
in this paper we solely focus on the goals of network members and network management by
assuming that they are constrained by the goals of other constituencies and, therefore, reflect
them insofar as they are constrained by them.
2.1.1 Network members’ goals
The entwinement of self and collective interests implies that the success of individual network
members is critical to success of the whole network and, conversely, positive outcomes for the
whole network contribute to the firm’s success. Thus, success of a supply chain network will
involve the achievement of network members’ goals which can be addressed in relation to the
abovementioned levels of a network. At the firm level, firms are setting their individual goals
whereas they are setting the collective goals at the network level.
Under network-level goals we understand the predefined set of outcomes that are collectively
pursued by all network members and that can be achieved only if all network members work
together. Although such shared goals have rarely been addressed in empirical analyses (SYDOW
AND WINDELER, 1998), their examples can be found in the food industry, e.g. various aspects of
food safety and quality addressing primarily the increasing consumers’ demands and the risk of
food scandals, i.e. goals such as total chain quality, end consumer satisfaction, etc. Despite we
define network-level goals as the collective outcomes, in strategic networks they have to be seen
as viable and acceptable primarily by the powerful stakeholders (SYDOW AND WINDELER, 1998:
274). As a type of strategic network, a supply chain network is most often deliberately
established by a powerful chain captain, either distributor- or manufacturer-brand owner, who
selects appropriate supply chain partners to develop products under its brand (BELAYA AND
HANF, 2009). We therefore suggest that the network-level goals are at first hand defined by a
powerful focal firm.
Arguing in this manner, we do not aim to contest the importance of firm-level goals, i.e. goals
which single firms want to achieve for themselves by participating in a network. Instead, we
emphasise that goals of the whole supply chain network involve network-level and firm-level
goals. The network-level goals are set by the focal actor and are jointly pursued by all the
network members. The firm-level goals are set by individual network participants that exert their
individual efforts in pursuit of these goals within a given network.
2.1.2 Goals of the network management
The achievement of goals of network members requires members to synchronise their actions as
well as to consent on goals and procedures to achieve goals. In this context, the above
conceptualised alignment of actions and alignment interests can be seen as goals of the network’s
management.
The alignment of actions is necessary to implement concerted, joint actions needed to capitalise
on the specialised but interdependent activities of partners (SCHREINER ET AL., 2009). In the
context of strategic networks, the firms need to combine and integrate their resources and
knowledge across organisational boundaries to create competitive advantage (GULATI ET AL.,
2000). Consequently, there exists high task interdependence between partners that involves
managing a complex and overlapping division of labour, linking their specific activities with each4
other, and making regular mutual adjustments. In such a situation, the greater the joint efforts
taken by the partners to manage their activities, and/or the more a partner becomes involved in
activities that are traditionally considered the other’s responsibility and vice versa, the greater
their ability to compete successfully with the marketplace (SCHREINER ET AL., 2009: 1402). The
aligned actions will consequently imply that partners provide timely and reliable responses to
each other’s work-related needs, being responsive to concerns arising at the firm level of
individual partners as well as at the network level. Accordingly, we hypothesise:
H 1: The alignment of actions has a direct positive effect on the achievement of network-level
goals.
H 2: The alignment of actions has a direct positive effect on the achievement of firm-level goals.
The alignment of interests means the establishment of good working relationships among the
parties. It addresses factors such as the degree of compatibility of firms’ cultures and decision-
making styles, a convergence of business views, and other organisational characteristics (ARIÑO
ET AL., 2001). The alignment of interests of the network members facilitates higher levels of
trustful relationships, commitment and low levels of conflict among members so that confidence
in the reliability and integrity of the partners is gained. Furthermore, the alignment of interests
enables organisations to gather high-quality information about the others and creates strong
disincentives for opportunistic behaviour (ARIÑO ET AL., 2001). Finally, interest alignment can be
defined as the degree to which the members of the organisation, e.g. strategic network, are
motivated to behave in line with organisational goals (GOTTSCHALG AND ZOLLO, 2007). We
therefore hypothesise that:
H 3: The alignment of interests has a direct positive effect on the achievement of network-level
goals.
H 4: The alignment of interests has a direct positive effect on the achievement of firm-level goals.
2.2 Determinants of goal achievement
In order to evaluate strategic networks, GULATI ET AL. (2000) have proposed to consider three
types of relational characteristics: network structure, network membership, and tie modality.
Network structural characteristics describe the overall pattern of relationships in the network.
Network member characteristics include the identities, resources, access, and other features of the
network actors. Tie modality is the set of institutionalised rules and norms that govern
appropriate behaviour in the network (GULATI ET AL. 2000: 205). Based on the ideas of GULATI
ET AL. (2000), we analyse respective constructs that reveal how the network structure, network
membership, and tie modalities affect the achievement of goals of the network management.
2.2.1 Network Structural Characteristics
Supply chain networks consist of a multitude of participating firms. Therefore, the embedded
upstream and downstream flows of resources and information have to cross various stages of the
chain while the involved firms differ widely in size. As a result, supply chain networks are highly
complex systems and they bear the high risk of failure. Hence, reducing complexity is one of the
most important tasks. In particular, the supply chain network’s management has to consider
comprehensively the levels of transparency and interdependence.
Transparency refers to the extent of coverage from upstream industries to downstream
industries within the supply chain and how apparent information is to downstream industries
(THEUVSEN, 2004: 125). DYER AND SINGH (1998) have emphasised the role of transparency in
transferring knowledge among partners. Because of the complex nature of supply chain networks,5
their structure is often not made public to all network members, and a feeling of anonymity may
appear. Such missing transparency of the network structure increases the probability of free-
riding. Transparency is associated with the establishment of strong ties and open communication.
Therefore, it will be primarily conducive to enabling the partners’ knowledge of each other’s
decision-making styles, and certainty in intentions of each other. We accordingly hypothesise
that:
H 5: Higher levels of transparency have a direct positive effect on the alignment of interests.
Interdependence is acknowledged by firms when they join forces to achieve mutually beneficial
outcomes (MOHR AND SPEKMAN, 1994). Supply chain network’s structure is characterised by
high numbers of interdependencies among members. In this respect, a firm’s performance
depends on how it environs itself with other companies (i.e., its suppliers and customers).
Because the magnitude of interdependencies is mainly disproportional at the different stages of
the supply chain, establishment of a joint action is an extremely difficult task. Furthermore,
beyond the firm’s set of first-level contacts, there is a limited amount of intentionality possible on
the part of the focal firm in terms of coordinating the wider network (GULATI ET AL., 2000).
Based on these arguments, we hypothesise:
H 6: Higher levels of interdependence have a direct negative effect on the alignment of actions.
2.2.2 Network Membership Characteristics
Research on networks focuses primarily on the interrelationships of firms but single enterprises
can be regarded as initial elements of networks because collaborations do not exist without them.
Each partner in a network dedicates its unique resources and capabilities which, when combined
with partners’ resources and capabilities, can create inimitable and non-substitutable value (DYER
AND SINGH, 1998). We therefore express the network membership characteristics by the
constructs of firms’ complementarities and coordination capabilities.
Network members’ complementarities create incentives for firms to collaborate (PARK AND
UNGSON, 2001). Noteworthy, collaborations do not inevitably create advantages for the involved
firms; instead, especially during their establishment, they absorb resources. Consequently,
without the firms’ willingness to cooperate, collaboration will not prevail. Thus, firms have to
recognise collaboration not as a constraint but as a means to access complementary resources.
Furthermore, since supply chain networks are formed to last over a long period,
complementarities are not only essential at the beginning of collaboration but throughout the
whole period. Thus, complementarities in culture and strategies (PARK AND UNGSON, 2001)
combined with resource complementarities (DYER AND SINGH, 1998) will be conducive to action
alignment among the network members.
H 7: Network members’ complementarities have a direct positive effect on the alignment of
actions.
Coordination capabilities of firms include necessary skills and abilities to establish learning
routines, build up unique and network-specific knowledge, use modern information technologies,
etc. Despite collaboration is determined by the complementary abilities of the involved firms,
only a part of the firm’s strategic resources is synergy sensitive (DYER AND SINGH, 1998).
Therefore, higher coordination capabilities of the network members have the potential to enhance
their concerted action (SCHREINER ET AL.,2009). As a result, we hypothesise:
H 8: Higher levels of coordination capabilities have a direct positive effect on the alignment of
actions.6
2.2.3 Tie Modalities
Whereas we acknowledge that the ultimate tie modalities will be reflected by the extent of
interest alignment, it is important to clarify how inherent distinctions among actors are smoothed
to preclude the negative consequences of relationships. To overcome problems of opportunistic
behaviour by the network members, some scholars pose that it is feasible to exert power (PAYAN
AND MCFARLAND, 2005), the others recommend to employ trust-based enforcement mechanisms
(DYER AND SINGH, 1998). Furthermore, several studies emphasise that the use of non-coercive
power (e.g., rewards, recommendations, etc.) has positive impact on the relationships while the
use of coercive power (e.g., punishment, threats, etc.) negatively affects the relationships
(LEONIDOU ET AL., 2008). We verify these suggestions by analysing the effects of trustful
relationships and non-coercive power on the alignment of interests.
H 9: Trustful relationships have a direct positive effect on the alignment of interests.
H 10: Use of non-coercive power has a direct positive effect on the alignment of interests.
3 Methodology
This section explains the survey design, the operationalisation of variables, and the statistical
procedure used to analyse the data.
3.1 Survey design
To test the model, data was collected from branded food manufacturers in Ukraine from
September 2009 to November 2009. We assume a branded food manufacturer to be a focal
company in a network of firms that work together to bring the branded product to the market. The
branded food manufacturer is responsible for the attributes of the branded product and, therefore,
is knowledgeable about the network to a large extent. The database of the firms was obtained
from the local-based market research company. Totally, 359 firms comprised the database.
A questionnaire was designed based on a review of literature on such variables as strategic
partnership, supply chain and strategic alliance performance
1. Then, the questionnaire was
pretested with five food chain specialists. Those specialists included buying and quality managers
of the international food retailers, CEO of the international standardisation bodies and a CEO of
non-governmental organisation being active in the food business. The respondents were asked to
make their comments on the order of questions, wording and format of the questionnaire. Their
feedback was considered to modify the questionnaire.
Telephone interviews were used for the data collection. Of the 359 branded food manufacturers,
101 interviews were conducted. This resulted in a 28 % response rate. Each interview lasted
about 20 minutes on average.
3.2 Measures
We turn now to operationalise the variables used in the model. Corresponding measures were
obtained from the literature on performance of supply chains, strategic alliances, strategic
partnerships and inter-organisational relationships.
Network members’ goal achievement. These measures assess the degree of fulfilment of goals
at the network and firm levels from the perspective of the focal firm. In each case, a four point-
scale measuring the informants’ assessment from “very dissatisfied” to “very satisfied” was
1 The questionnaire can be provided by authors upon request.7
employed. At the network level, the focal company’s overall satisfaction with cooperation
(ARIÑO, 2003) as well as its assessment of overall satisfaction by its suppliers and customers
were used as the measures of network-level goal achievement. We also employed the focal
actor’s satisfaction with the total chain quality and sales of the branded product as measures at
the network level. At the firm level, we operationalised goal achievement by satisfaction of the
focal firm’s suppliers and customers with knowledge gained within a network, reputation from
cooperation as well as with profit generated within a network (SCHREINER ET AL.,2009).
Network management’s goal achievement. We operationalised the alignment of interests by the
following measures: focal company’s satisfaction with communication within a network (MOHR
AND SPEKMAN, 1994), confidence in reliability of the partners (SCHREINER ET AL., 2009) and the
extent of suppliers’ and customers’ relation-specific investments (DYER AND SINGH, 1998). The
alignment of actions was measured by the responsiveness of suppliers and customers and their
willingness to perform necessary tasks (PROVAN AND KENIS, 2007; SCHREINER ET AL., 2009). In
each case, a four point-scale measuring the focal firms’ assessment from “very dissatisfied” to
“very satisfied” was employed.
Network Structural Characteristics. Transparency was measured by the focal company’s
degree of awareness of suppliers’ and customers’ decision-making styles and by the degree of
openness of the focal firm’s decision-making styles to suppliers and customers. The measures of
interdependence were drawn form MOHR AND SPEKMAN (1994) and include the extent to which
the focal firm is able to easily substitute its suppliers and buyers and vice versa (reverse coded).
For both, transparency and interdependence, a four point-scale from “totally disagree” to “totally
agree” was employed.
Network Membership Characteristics. The cultural and the strategic fit (PARK AND UNGSON,
2001) of suppliers and customers measured the network members’ complementarities.
Coordination capabilities were operationalised by the suppliers’ and customers’ agreement on
task distribution and by their firm size (SCHREINER ET AL., 2009). For both, complementarities
and coordination capabilites, we used a four point-scale from “totally disagree” to “totally agree.”
Tie Modalities. We measured trustful relationships by the focal firm’s willingness to always
inform its suppliers and customers about future steps and by the suppliers’ and buyers’ perception
of favourability of participation in a network (MOHR AND SPEKMAN, 1994). The use of non-
coercive power was measured by frequency of placing bonuses and providing recommendations
to suppliers and customers (PAYAN AND MCFARLAND, 2005). For trustful relationships, a four
point-scale measuring the informants’ assessment from “totally disagree” to “totally agree” was
employed; the use of non-coercive power was measured by a four point scale from “very rarely”
to “very frequently.”
3.3 Path analysis
To test the model, we used the Partial Least Squares (PLS) technique for Structural Equation
Modeling using the SmartPLS software 2.0.1 (HENSELER ET AL., 2009). Our decision to use PLS
was based on its advantages compared to other techniques, i.e., the possibility to analyse small
size samples in the absence of distribution assumptions. PLS involves analysis of two forms of
variables, i.e., the latent and manifest variables. Manifest variables that make no significant
contributions to the respective latent variables are progressively removed and the analysis is
repeated until all the manifest variables are significant (GYAU ANDSPILLER,2009).
4 Results8
In this section, we test the model and represent the estimated results.
4.1 Testing the measurement model
The fit of the measurement model in PLS is evaluated with regard to the inner and the outer
models. Individual item reliabilities and convergent validity of the model provide information
about the fit of the outer model. The individual item reliabilities are evaluated via the factor
loadings of the items on their constructs. According to HAIR ET AL. (1998), an item is considered
insignificant and removed from the model if its factor loading is less than 0.4
2. We also
calculated the composite reliability of the measurements to evaluate internal consistency of the
measurements. All the composite reliability indices for the constructs exceed the recommended
0.7 homogeneity criterion. The convergent validity was estimated by calculating the Average
Variance Extracted (AVE). The recommended threshold of 0.5 (BAGOZZI AND YI, 1988) was
exceeded for all the constructs indicating that the chosen indicators are explained by their
respective constructs.
The fit of the inner model was evaluated by the discriminant validity criterion which means that
every construct is significantly different from the others. The first way to analyse discriminant
validity is a comparison of item loadings and cross loadings. If all loadings are higher than cross
loadings, then the construct significantly differs from the others. The second way is to compare
the square root of the AVE with the correlation between the construct and the other constructs.
The square root of the AVE should be higher than the correlation between the constructs (GYAU
ANDSPILLER,2009). In both cases, our results support the fit of the inner model.
Table 1: Results of the structural model
Hypotheses Constructs Expected sign Beta coefficients (b) Correlation
coefficient (r) b*r
H1 Alignment of actions → 
Network-level goals + 0.644
*** 0.667 0.430
H2 Alignment of actions → 
Firm-level goals + 0.384
*** 0.403 0.155
H3 Alignment of interests
→ Network-level goals + 0.275
* 0.328 0.090
H4 Alignment of interests
→ Firm-level goals + 0.226
*** 0.258 0.058
H5 Transparency → 
Alignment of interests + 0.271
*** 0.358 0.097
H6 Interdependence → 
Alignment of actions - -0.338
*** -0.408 0.138
H7 Complementarities → 
Alignment of actions + 0.087 0.020 0.002
H8 Coordination capabilities
→ Alignment of actions + 0.185
* 0.335 0.062
H9 Trustful relationships → 
Alignment of interests + 0.379
*** 0.375 0.142
H10 Non-coercive power → 
Alignment of interests + 0.326
* 0.312 0.102
4.2 The structural model
2 Due to space limitations, we do not provide tables with the results of the measurement model testing. The tables
can be provided by authors upon request.9
The structural model was evaluated based on the R
2 and the significance of the path coefficients.
The variances explained (R
2) for each of the endogenous variables were as follows: achievement
of network-level goals 0.520, achievement of firm-level goals 0.213, alignment of interests 0.341,
and alignment of actions 0.216. Considering the complexity of the research model, the results for
the achievement of network-level goals which we brought to the forefront of our argumentation
are indicating good fit. In addition, rather moderate R
2 values for the achievement of firm-level
goals and the alignment of actions reflect the complex nature and manifold determinants of these
constructs. To determine the significance of the path coefficient we used bootstrap method with
200 re-sampling. Path coefficients and their significance are shown in Table 1. The standardised
path coefficients can be used to analyse the degree of accomplishment of the hypotheses. One
may multiply the path coefficients by the correlation coefficient between the latent variables to
obtain an approximate measure of the variance of the construct explained by the latent predictive
variable (GYAU AND SPILLER, 2009). We show the result in Table 1. Using this approach, one
might consider values of less than 1.5 % as not making significant contribution to their respective
latent variables (GYAU AND SPILLER, 2009: 30). Based on this criterion, we accepted nine out of
the ten hypotheses that were formulated.
5 Discussion
This study contributes to research on the food chain and network management by investigating
goals that are pursued in supply chain networks. Prior empirical research has been characterised
by numerous efforts to analyse supply chain and network performance. However, these efforts
have rarely addressed network-level goals, i.e. goals that are jointly pursued by all network
members. This is in spite of theoretical studies that have conceptualised the achievement of
shared goals as the measure of network effectiveness (PROVAN AND KENIS, 2007). Building on
those theoretical elaborations as well as on few empirical contributions, we provide a theoretical
account of goals that are set in supply chain networks. We conceptualise goals of a whole supply
chain network as those set by members at the firm and network levels. Moreover, we relate the
achievement of network-level and firm-level goals of network members to achievement of goals
of the network management. The latter include the alignment of interests and the alignment of
actions which, if fulfilled simultaneously, pave the way for the achievement of both network-
level and firm-level goals of network participants. Furthermore, we hypothesise that the interest
and action alignment are contingent upon a number of network characteristics.
Our empirical results support our theoretical suppositions. First of all, the construct of network-
level goals demonstrates high reliability and validity of the items. This implies that the network-
level goals really exist in the business world and have to be treated as an inherent aspect of
strategic networks. Inappropriate communication of network-level goals by chain captains will
lead to a lack of understanding by the other network members. As a consequence, collaboration
failures may occur, inducing costs for the relationship parties. This strongly correlates with the
results by BRINKHOFF AND THONEMANN (2007) who have found that unclear definition of
common goals was the major reason of failure in supply chain inter-organisational projects.
Second, the achievement of network-level goals is to a large extent explained by how properly
cooperation and coordination problems are solved by the network management. Our results
support hypotheses H1 and H3 which state that the alignment of actions and the alignment of
interests, respectively, have a positive effect on the achievement of members’ goals at the
network level. This finding supports the ideas by GULATI ET AL. (2005) and HANF AND
DAUTZENBERG (2006) who highlight the strategic value of viewing chain management as a
multifaceted construct that consists of cooperation and coordination elements at the different10
levels. In particular, the alignment of actions has a strong and significant effect on the
achievement of network-level goals emphasising the role of a joint action and strong coordination
skills by the focal actor in achieving shared outcomes.
Hypotheses H2 and H4 are also supported, i.e. both the alignment of actions and the alignment of
interests have a significant positive effect on the achievement of firm-level goals. Thus, as
supposed by MEDLIN (2006), the joint action and collective interest constructs are closely linked
to individual constructs in business relationships. In our case, this implies that successful chain
management has beneficial outcomes also at the firm level of suppliers and customers. Although
the respective effects (path coefficients) are weaker at the firm level than at the network level, the
effect of interest alignment (t-value) on firm-level goals is even more significant than on
network-level goals. As a result, we suggest that the aligned interests, i.e. good working
relationships are important to improve perceptions by single suppliers and customers with regard
to achievement of their individual goals.
Interest alignment is, in turn, subject to significant positive effect by higher levels of
transparency, trustful relationships, and non-coercive power as proposed in hypotheses H5, H9,
and H10, respectively. These results are consistent with the findings of earlier research. For
example, DEIMEL ET AL. (2008) have revealed that high levels of transparency are associated with
explicitness and clearness of information as well as with partner commitment. HANDFIELD AND
BECHTEL (2002) have shown that trustful relationships have a significant effect on partner
responsiveness. LEONIDOU ET AL. (2008) have found that the exercise of non-coercive power is
negatively related to conflict in inter-firm working relationships.
The alignment of actions is negatively affected by higher levels of interdependence. This result
supports our hypothesis H6 and is consistent with the results of MOHR AND SPEKMAN (1994) who
have modelled positive relation between higher level of interdependence and partnership success
but found no significant correlation. Although interdependence is usually addressed as enabler of
collaboration, we analyse this construct in the context of a whole supply chain network.
Accordingly, higher interdependence in relationship with e.g. supplier implies higher
contingency upon volatilities in supplier’s relationships with its suppliers. As a result, action
alignment appears to be complicated. In this regard, we have also taken into account specifics of
our research setting. Despite wide scope of vertical coordination practices and the growing use of
chain management concepts, business environment in Ukraine is highly volatile with persisting
infrastructural problems (GAGALYUK ANDHANF,2009).
The remaining hypotheses (H7 and H8) speculated that network members’ complementarities and
higher levels of coordination capabilities have a direct positive effect on coordination. Only the
latter of these constructs has a significant influence on the alignment of actions indicating that the
suppliers’ and customers’ abilities to identify and build consensus about task requirements in a
network contribute to successful resolution of coordination problems and establishment of a joint
action. This result coincides with the findings of SCHREINER ET AL. (2009) who have confirmed
the positive link between alliance management capability and joint action. At the same time,
higher levels of coordination capabilities exhibit rather moderate effect on the alignment of
actions (path coefficient = 0.185). Since we measure only the capabilities of suppliers and
customers within this construct, a moderate indicator emphasises high requirements towards
coordination skills of the focal actor. This supports proposition by PROVAN AND KENIS (2007)
who have suggested that networks with lead organisations will demonstrate a moderate need for
network-level competencies of members as lead organisation is better suited to address network-
level demands and needs.11
In general, our results with regard to the effects of network structure, membership and tie
modalities on the outcomes of supply chain network management are not surprising as they
correspond to the findings of the other authors. The results, however, must be accepted with some
caution as we surveyed only focal firms. Accordingly, future research should take a direction
similar to what GELLYNCK ET AL. (2008) did in the traditional food sector in the EU, i.e. it should
encompass all network participants. Yet, it should also take account of both, shared and
individual goals of network members. Another issue for future research would be comparison of
goal achievement among different supply chain networks. Hereby, the approach we used, i.e.
focus on perceived rather than objective measures seems to be suitable because different supply
chain networks have distinctive features and, thus, objective measures will mean little without a
benchmark for comparison.
Overall, we contend that the most important finding of our study is that the network-level goals
really exist in strategic networks and must be considered along with firm-level goals. As such,
the topic of network goals has to be of particular interest for firms which are responsible for
introduction and implementation of the network’s strategy (often referred to as a collective
strategy). Those focal firms or chain captains have to be particularly concerned that the network
participants agree upon network-level goals and work together to achieve them. Thus, shared
goals have to be clearly formulated and explicitly addressed, and a certain degree of compatibility
between network-level and firm-level goals has to be reached. Therefore, the interests and the
actions of the involved parties have to be aligned with consideration of the parties’ social and
organisational characteristics. Especial attention should be paid to the development of network
management capabilities that would enable capturing of goals of the whole network.
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